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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FOURTH

AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND

SEIZURE-GRAND JURY REQUEST FOR HAIR SAMPLES IS NOT

SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINTS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mils) (1982)
Suspected of being the masked robber of a Delaware bank, I Cecil Mills
was required to appear before a grand jury pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus ad tesl &andum.2 During the proceedings, the grand jury directed
Mills to provide hair samples from his scalp and face for comparison with
hair removed from a ski mask abandoned during the crime. 3 Mills refused
to comply, and the government obtained an order in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware compelling Mills to submit to the
hair sampling.4 Mills, having consulted with counsel, refused to comply
with the court order unless served with a valid search warrant. 5 The government refused to seek a search warrant and Mills moved the district court to
1. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills), 686 F.2d 135, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. dented,
103 S. Ct. 386 (1982). On December 17, 1980, at least two men entered and robbed a
Wilmington, Delaware bank. Id. at 136. One of the robbers wore a dark blue ski
mask that was recovered by the police at the scene of the robbery. Id. Possibly, a
third person remained outside and drove the getaway car. Id. at 136 n.1. The undisguised robber was subsequently apprehended and convicted of violating the federal
bank robbery statute. Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a)-2113(b) (1976).
The government suspected that Mills was the masked robber, but the only support offered for its suspicion was the speculation that his height and weight approximated that of the masked robber described by the eyewitnesses. 686 F.2d at 136 n.2.
2. 686 F.2d at 136. A writ of habeas corpus ad testiftandum is used by a grand
jury to bring persons detained in jail or prison before the grand jury to testify. See,
e.g., Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 556 (1961) (prisoner serving six-year
sentence for drug conviction brought before grand jury by a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum to provide testimony); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d
420,421-22 (3d Cir. 1979) (prisoner serving two-year conviction for racketeering, conspiracy and uttering forged checks brought before grand jury to testify); In re Grand
Jury Investigation (Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 167 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1047 (1977) (inmate incarcerated for loansharking brought before grand jury to testify about illegal loansharking activities).
3. 686 F.2d at 136. In addition to requesting hair samples, the grand jury also
directed Mills to "permit agents of the grand jury to accurately measure his height
and weight for comparison with eyewitness descriptions and bank camera recordings
of the robbery." Id.
4. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills), 522 F. Supp. 500, 501 (D. Del. 1981),
rev'd, 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 386 (1982).
5. Id. The district court entered an order "requiring Mills to permit the taking
of hair samples and the measurement of his height and weight by a doctor or other
trained medical personnel under the supervision of an agent of the Grand Jury." Id.
Mills refused to comply with both the hair sampling and the measurement of his
height and weight. Id.

(805)
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6
vacate or modify its enforcement order.
The district court vacated its previous order,7 finding that the hair samples could be obtained only through the warrant process upon a showing of
probable cause.8 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit 9 reversed, holding that a directive to furnish scalp and facial
hair samples to a grand jury is not a seizure entitled to fourth amendment
protection. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills), 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 386 (1982).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
all people shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.' 0 When the
government 1 I seeks evidence through an examination of an individual's personal characteristics, such as blood or fingerprints, the fourth amendment is

6. 686 F.2d at 136.
7. 522 F. Supp. at 502. Although the district court vacated its previous order
compelling Mills to submit to the hair sampling, it left intact its ruling that Mills
permit the grand jury to measure his height and weight. Id. Judge Steel saw no
fourth amendment interest implicated in the measurement of height and weight
under the settled principle that the constraints of the fourth amendment do not apply in the case of manifest physical characteristics. id. at 501 (citing United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); In re Melvin,
550 F.2d 674, 676 (1st Cir. 1977)). For a discussion of Diontsti and Mara, see notes 2427 and accompanying text thfra. Judge Steel concluided that because complying with
the request for height and weight measurements was "less inconvenient and humiliating" than the grand jury lineup to identify facial characteristics in Melvin, the request
for height and weight measurements involved as little an expectation of privacy as
facial characteristics. 522 F. Supp. at 501.
8. 522 F. Supp. at 501. The district court viewed the demand for hair samples
as distinguishable from requests examined in previous Supreme Court decisions
which found no fourth amendment interest in voice and handwriting exemplars. Id.
According to the court, the seizure of hair was more akin to the police seizure of
blood samples which is subject to the fourth amendment and requires a warrant
absent exigent circumstances. Id. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
For a discussion of Schmerber, see notes 32-35 and accompanying text infra. See also
United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (blood, hair and other
body components can only be seized through the warrant process).
The district court also found no exigent circumstances which permitted the government to proceed without a warrant since Mills was incarcerated at the time of the
grand jury demand. 522 F. Supp. at 502. Accordingly, the district court vacated its
previous order directing Mills to submit to the hair sampling. Id.
9. The case was heard by Judges Gibbons, Sloviter and Becker. Judge Sloviter
wrote the majority opinion and Judge Gibbons filed a concurring opinion.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides as follows:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable Cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.

11. The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies only to governmental conduct. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 487-88 (1971) (private citizen searching for and seizing evidence does not
implicate the fourth amendment); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (origin
and history of fourth amendment clearly show it restrains only the activities of sover-
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potentially implicated at two different levels-the initial seizure of the person, and the subsequent search for and seizure of evidence. 12 In order to
implicate an individual's fourth amendment rights, a "search" or a "seizure"
within the meaning of that amendment must initially occur. 13 Although
these terms have never been strictly defined, 14 the Supreme Court has held
that an evaluation of both a person's expectation of privacy 15 and the intrusiveness of the governmental conduct 16 are required in order to determine,
in a particular case, the presence of a search or seizure. 17
In Katz v. Unted States,'1 8 the Supreme Court explained that the fourth
amendment protects individuals from governmental interference where a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists.1 9 The Katz Court reasoned that the
Constitution does not protect what a person "knowingly exposes to the pubeign authority). The requirements of the fourth amendment are applicable to both
the state and federal governments. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Set, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). For
a discussion of Davrt, Diontst'o, and Schmerber, see notes 24-27, 32-35 & 38-40 and accompanying text tf/a. It is important to note that the focus of most cases is upon the
initial seizure of the person, rather than the search and seizure of the evidence, because the legal arrest of a suspect validates many searches incident to arrest. See W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6(a), at 362 (1976). See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1974) (police interest in gathering evidence outweighs a
suspect's privacy after arrest); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) (illegal
detention causes exclusion of fingerprint evidence gained after the illegal detentions).
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973);see also Amsterdam,
13. See, e.g.,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974); W. LAFAVE,
supra note 12, § 2.1, at 221.
14. See Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 361-63.

15. For a discussion of an individual's expectation of privacy, see notes 18-27
and accompanying text infra.
16. For a discussion of the intrusiveness of governmental conduct, see notes 2848 and accompanying text ifa.
17. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). For a discussion of these cases, see
notes 24-27 & 32-40 and accompanying text in/ra. The Supreme Court has also used
this same inquiry into the expectation of privacy and intrusiveness of governmental
conduct in order to determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure which implicated the fourth amendment. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (limited
intrusion was justified under the circumstances); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767-68 (blood sampling was a reasonable seizure due to exigent circumstances).
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, government agents attached a
listening device to the outside of a phone booth, enabling the agents to overhear the
defendant transmitting wagering information in violation of a federal statute. Id. at
348. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1976). Instead of continuing its past practice of delineating constitutionally protected areas, the Court discarded this artificial concept and
shifted its inquiry to an individual's expectation of privacy. 389 U.S. at 351. The
basis for this analytical change stemmed from the conclusion that the "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." d. The defendant's conviction was reversed for the government's failure to obtain a warrant from a neutral and detached
magistrate. Id. at 358-59.
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lic." 20 The Katz decision changed the focus of fourth amendment inquiry
from the protection of places to the protection of an individual's justified
expectations of privacy. 2' This change in analysis was necessarily accompanied by the question of the fourth amendment's applicability to the search
22
and seizure of personal characteristics.
The Supreme Court, following the Katz rationale, has held that the protections of the fourth amendment do not extend to bodily characteristics
which are constantly exposed to the public. 2 3 For instance, in UnItedStates v.
Dzonzsio, 24 the Supreme Court, in addition to holding that the initial appearance required by a grand jury subpoena does not implicate the fourth
amendment, 25 found that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a
person's voice. 26 The Dioni'sio Court determined that vocal characteristics
20. 389 U.S. at 315.
21. Id. The Supreme Court has since found expectations of privacy in many
items and places and accordingly has required the police to obtain a warrant or
demonstrate an exception to the warrant requirement before conducting a search or
seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) (automobile); Steagald
v. United States, 415 U.S. 204 (1981) (home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980) (home); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (films); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (automobiles); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)
(apartment); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (fire damaged building); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (footlocker); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)
(body search).
22. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). For a discussion of
Dionwiro, see notes 24-27 and accompanying text infra. Searches of the person generally require some sort of physical contact with the body. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (fingernail scraping); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)
(patdown search); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968) (rummaging through
pockets); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (blood sampling). On
the other hand, characteristics of an individual that are exposed to the public are
usually not "searched," in the sense of physical contact, by the government. See
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1973) (voice exemplars); United States
v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (handwriting samples). For a general discussion of
cases delineating searches and seizures, see Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 356-58.
23. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text ihfra.
24. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
25. Id. at 9-10. The Supreme Court has stated that no fourth amendment
"seizure" of the person exists when one is called to testify pursuant to a valid grand
jury subpoena. Id See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (citizens are not
constitutionally immune from the grand jury process); Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 281 (1919) ("The personal sacrifice involved is part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.") See generally Note, UnitedSlates
v. Dionz'o; The Grand jury and the Fourth Amendment, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1145

(1973).
26. 410 U.S. at 14-15. The defendants in Dionisto were subpoenaed to appear
before a grand jury and provide voice exemplars for comparison with previously recorded conversations of persons engaged in illegal gambling activities. Id. at 3.
When Dionisio refused to provide the exemplars he was held in civil contempt. Id. at
4. On appeal from this judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned that any production of physical evidence absent proof of the reasonableness of
the demand does not comport with the mandates of the fourth amendment. Dionisio
v. United States, 442 F.2d 276, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1971) (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969)). Because the grand jury made no showing of reasonableness, the
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were constantly exposed to the public in the same manner as one's facial
characteristics or handwriting, negating any reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus held that a grand jury directive to produce voice exemplars
27
did not implicate the witness' fourth amendment rights.
In addition to determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists, the Supreme Court has required that a person claiming the protections of the fourth amendment demonstrate that the governmental conduct
involved resulted in a significant intrusion into a protected area. 28 In Terry v.
Ohio, 29 the Court considered the intrusiveness of the patdown search, 30 and
concluded that despite its limited nature, the search "constitutes a severe
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security" subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment. 3 ' In Schmerber v. California,32 a blood samcourt of appeals reversed the contempt conviction. Id. at 281. However, the
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the court of appeals, finding no
need for proof of reasonableness because it found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his voice:
There is no basis for constructing a wall of privacy against the grand jury
which does not exist in casual contacts with strangers. Hence no intrusion
into an individual's privacy results from compelled execution of handwriting or voice exemplars; nothing is being exposed to the grand jury that has
not previously been exposed to the public at large.
410 U.S. at 14 (quoting United States v. Doe (In re Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 898-99
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 941 (1972)).
27. 410 U.S. at 14. In a companion case to Dio'niso, the Supreme Court determined the applicability of the fourth amendment to a grand jury request for handwriting exemplars. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973). In Mara, the
defendant refused to furnish handwriting samples to a grand jury and was held in
contempt. Id. at 20. Justice Stewart reasoned that "[h]andwriting, like speech, is
repeatedly shown to the public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the
physical characteristics of a person's script than there is in the tone of his voice." Id.
at 21 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Mara Court held that no fourth amendment protection was required. Id. at 21-22. See also In re Melvin, 550 F.2d 674, 676
(1st Cir. 1977) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in exposure of physical appearance in lineup before grand jury).
28. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). The Schmerber
Court stated that "the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." Id. For a discussion of
the intrusiveness of various forms of governmental conduct, see notes 29-48 and accompanying text infra.
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30. Id. at 5-7. In Tey, a police officer stopped and frisked three men that he
suspected of preparing to commit a robbery. Id. In discussing the applicability of
the fourth amendment to this kind of seizure, Justice Warren explained that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer
torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the
outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to
find weapons is not a "search."
Id at 16.
31. Id. at 24-25. The Tey Court fashioned a test to be used in determining the
reasonableness of a police officer's "stop and frisk." Id. at 20-22. The Court balanced
the governmental interest justifying intrusion against the protected interests of the
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pling procedure was evaluated for its degree of intrusiveness. 3 3
Characterizing the removal of blood from below the body surface as a significant intrusion, 34 the Court unequivocally found that blood sampling was
subject to fourth amendment restrictions. 35 Similarly, the Supreme Court,
in Cupp v. Murphy, 36 decided that the scraping of a suspect's fingernails for
traces of blood and skin fragments was subject to fourth amendment constraints as it was the same type of "severe though brief" intrusion subjected
to constitutional scrutiny in Terry v. Ohio. 3 7 However, in Davis v. Missisprivate citizen, concluding that the circumstances must " 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate." Id. at 22 (quoting
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)). For a discussion of Terry and its progeny,
see W. LAFAvE, supra note 12, § 9, at 2-175; C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.02, at 171-95 (1980).
32. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
33. Id. at 758-59. The defendant was involved in an automobile accident in
which he sustained injuries. Id. at 758 n. 12. When the police arrived at the accident
scene, an officer smelled liquor on the defendant's breath and observed symptoms of
drunkenness. Id. at 769. Following transportation to the hospital, the police officer
instructed the attending physician to administer a blood test and as a result arrested
the defendant. Id.
34. The Court held the fourth amendment to be applicable:
It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed respondent does not argue,
that the administration of the blood test in this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of "persons," and depend antecedently upon seizures of
"persons," within the meaning of that Amendment.
35. Id. Although the Schmerber Court found that the fourth amendment was
implicated and thus imposed a reasonableness requirement upon the search, the majority found the search constitutionally permissible without a warrant because of the
possible destruction of evidence. Id. at 770. Taking judicial notice of the fact that
the "percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking
stops," the Court found the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under
the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence'.

. .

." Id.

Because of

these "special facts," the search was appropriate as incident to the petitioner's arrest.
Id. at 771. The majority cautioned, however, that its holding was limited:
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society.
That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in
no way indicates that it permits more substantial iitrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions.
Id. at 772. See also Chimel v. California, 394 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (warrant is not
needed to search a person incident to arrest where arrestee might possess concealed
weapons or attempt to destroy incriminating evidence).

36. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
37. Id. at 295. Defendant Murphy voluntarily came to the police station accompanied by counsel to discuss the circumstances of his wife's murder. Id. at 292. After
some initial questioning, the police noticed a dark spot on Murphy's finger and, suspecting that it was dried blood, asked him to permit a scraping of his fingernails. Id.
Murphy refused, causing the police to take the samples without a warrant. Id. Subsequently, the traces of skin and blood cells removed from the respondent's
fingernails were matched with those of the victim. Id. Murphy was eventually convicted of second-degree murder. Id.
Analyzing the intrusion involved in fingernail scraping, the majority equated it

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/16

6

Seitz: Criminal Procedure - Fourth Amendment - Search and Seizure - Gran

1982-83]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

sippt',3 8 the Court opined in dictum that the detention of a suspect39 for the
purpose of obtaining fingerprints constituted a far less serious intrusion upon
personal security than other types of police searches and stated that in certain narrowly defined circumstances fingerprints could be taken even with40
out the traditional fourth amendment requirement of probable cause.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals have also had occasion to examine the
fourth amendment's applicability to bodily characteristics. In United States v.
Richardson,4 the Sixth Circuit held that the examination of a suspect's hands
under ultraviolet light was too far removed from the degree of intrusion necessary to implicate the fourth amendment. 42 However, the Ninth Circuit, in
Bouse v. Bussey 43 applied the constraints of the fourth amendment to the
seizure of pubic hair forcibly removed from the plaintiffs body. 44 Finally, in
to the "severe, though brief" intrusion of the patdown search rather than the less
intrusive nature of the fingerprinting process. Id. at 295 (citing United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
Even though the fourth amendment was applicable to the fingernail scraping,
the search in Cupp was found constitutionally permissible because of the "existence of
probable cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken incident to the station house
detention, and the ready destructability of the evidence." Id. at 296.
38. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
39. Id. A local police force took twenty-four black youths, including Davis, into
police headquarters over a period of about ten days, without warrants. The youths
were fingerprinted, questioned briefly, and released. Id. at 722. Davis was questioned on subsequent occasions and exhibited to a rape victim in her hospital room.
Id. at 722-23. Even though the victim did not identify Davis as her assailant, the
police drove him ninety miles to another city, placed him in jail, fingerprinted him a
second time, and administered a lie detector test. Id. at 723. The Court found that
during this time, the police were acting without a warrant or probable cause. Id.
40. Id. at 727-28. The Court indicated that a detention of suspects for fingerprinting purposes in some circumstances might comply with the fourth amendment
for several reasons. Id. First, the taking of fingerprints involves none of the personal
intrusions accompanying an interrogation or search. Id. Second, the fingerprinting
process cannot be used to harass an individual because only one set of prints is necessary for police records. Id. Finally, the reliability of the process as well as the absence
of the danger of destruction is such that the detention to obtain fingerprints need be
neither unexpected nor inconvenient, although this latter factor also counseled
against any necessary exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
41. 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968).
42. Id. at 845. The defendant was suspected of having participated in a bank
robbery occurring earlier in the afternoon of the search. Id. at 843-44. The money
bags had been dusted with flourescein powder which illuminated when exposed to
ultraviolet light. Id. The Richardson court simply stated that "[w]e do not regard the
examination of appellant's hands under the ultra-violet light as a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 845 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966)). Additionally, the court found that the defendant had consented to
the search if one in fact took place, whereas in Schmerber, the blood sample was taken
without the defendant's consent. Id.
43. 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977).
44. Id. at 550-51. The appellant, Bouse, brought a § 1983 action against a state
police officer alleging a fourth amendment violation. Id. at 549. Reversing a district
court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted, the court declared:
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United States v. Allen ,45 a district court concluded that the taking of x-rays,
hair samples, and blood samples would result in as significant an intrusion as
that in Schmerber v. Caifornia.46 The district court recognized that an x-ray is
not technically "seized" from a suspect, 47 yet considered its penetration into
48
the body no less an invasion than blood sampling.
It is true that some investigative procedures designed to obtain incriminating evidence from the person are such minor intrusions upon privacy
and integrity that they are not generally considered searches or seizures subject to the safeguards of the fourth amendment .

. .

. We cannot, however,

characterize the intrusion allegedly perpetrated by the police in this case as
minor. It was sufficiently severe to constitute a search. The search of the
appellant's person "went beyond mere 'physical characteristics . . . con-

stantly exposed to the public,' and constituted the type of 'severe, though
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security' that is subject to constitutional scrutiny." If appellant's contentions are true, he was subjected to a
painful and humiliating invasion upon the most intimate parts of his anatomy, and when the police perform such an investigation, they are bound to
comply with the requirements of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 550 (citations omitted).
See also United States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1969). In D'Amico, the
police simply clipped a few strands of the defendant's head hair to compare with hair
samples taken from a ski mask abandoned at a robbery scene. Id. at 332. The court
stated that "[u]nquestionably, the clipping of the few strands of appellant's hair by a
federal agent constituted a 'seizure' that migh conceivably be subject to the 'constraints of the Fourth Amendment.' " Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). However, the court then qualified this statement by considering the hair sampling "so
minor an imposition" that it was no more "prejudicial or offensive than the taking of
his fingerprints or his photograph." Id. at 333. See also In re Melvin, 550 F.2d 674,
676 (1st Cir. 1977) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in exposure of physical appearance in a lineup before a grand jury).
45. 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
46. Id. at 1043. In Allen, the government submitted a motion to the district
court requesting an order compelling the defendants to submit to an examination of
their physical characteristics. Id. The request was for hair and blood samples, as well
as an x-ray of one of the defendant's arms. Id. Although the district court judge
recognized that the fourth amendment did not bar the government from obtaining
the desired samples so long as lawful procedures were followed, the court questioned
its ability to sanction the sampling on the basis of a government motion. Id. Since
no Rule of Criminal Procedure supported such an order, the judge decided that the
government must apply for a warrant instead of merely submitting a motion. Id.
The judge stated that "[t]he opinion of the Court in Schmerber . . . leads to the conclusion that blood, hair and other bodily components are objects to be seized only
through the warrant process or one of the recognized exceptions thereto." Id.
47. Id. The district court judge stated:
Of course an x-ray is not actually seized from the person x-rayed, but the
use of his body to make the x-ray is so seized and considering that x-rays
actually penetrate the body we cannot say as a matter of law that it is less
an invasion than the taking of blood.
Id.
48. Id. The district court judge distinguished the request for x-rays, hair samples, and blood samples from fingerprinting and "other routine and relatively mild
invasions of a person's bodily integrity which are normally done pursuant to an arrest." Id. Finally, the district court concluded that even if the government's motion
were treated as an application for a search warrant, it had to be denied because the
motion failed to establish probable cause. Id. at 1044.
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It was against this background that the Third Circuit, in Mills, was
faced with the issue of whether the fourth amendment requires a grand jury
to obtain a search warrant prior to directing a witness to furnish scalp and
facial hair samples. 49 Initially, the court rejected the defendant's assertion
that the grand jury's subpoena to appear constituted a seizure of the individual. 50 Concluding that no fourth amendment interest was implicated by the
subpoena, 5 1 the Third Circuit proceeded to consider a second level of potential fourth amendment violation-the subsequent search for and seizure of
52
evidence.
The Mills court first examined the Supreme Court's delineation of
49. 686 F.2d at 137. The Mills court refused to review Mills' cross-appeal challenging the district court's order permitting the grand jury to take height and weight
measurements. Id. at 140-4 1. The court held that denials of motions to quash grand
jury subpoenas are not final orders appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Id.
See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323 (1940). According to the court, the rationale for denying appeals from
motions to quash rests in the policy that the ongoing investigatory process of the
grand jury should remain unfettered. 686 F.2d at 140. See In re Grand Jury Empanelled August 14, 1979, 638 F.2d 1235, 1236 (3d Cir. 1981) (delaying grand jury
investigating process would hinder their ability to "promptly perform their task").
Despite Mill's argument that his cross-appeal did not interrupt the grand jury proceedings, the Mills court concluded that "unified appellate presentation must yield to
the necessity of avoiding unnecessary obstructions to the orderly progress of the
grand jury's investigation." 686 F.2d at 140 (citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940); In re Grand Jury Empanelled August 14, 1979, 638 F.2d
1235, 1236 (3d Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, the cross-appeal was not a final order appeallable under § 1291, leaving Mills the choice between compliance with the district
court's order or a possible adjudication of contempt. 686 F.2d at 141. See United
States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971) (defendant may comply with subpoena
or subject himself to contempt proceedings).
50. 686 F.2d at 137. The Mills court stated that after the Supreme Court's decision in Dionito, a subpoena to appear before a grand jury was not a fourth amendment seizure. Id. (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973)). For a
discussion of Dionisto, see notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
51. 686 F.2d at 137 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973)).
Mills argued that the district court's order should be vacated because of the possibility that the grand jury was "operating a simple dragnet," compelling black males of
appropriate physical stature to appear before the grand jury and supply hair samples
and height and weight measurements. Id. at 137. The Mills court found the
Supreme Court's decision in Dionisto to be dispositive of the issue stating that such a
"dragnet" would not be prohibited. Id. In Dionisio, the Court distinguished the issuance of subpoenas to twenty persons from the unlawful police detentions to obtain
fingerprints without probable cause which occurred in Davis v. Mississi)opi. The
Court held that the initial restraint of a person by a grand jury subpoena did not
implicate the fourth amendment. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11
(1973). Accordingly, the Mills court concluded that the grand jury subpoena summoning Mills to appeal was not a seizure for purposes of the fourth amendment. 686
F.2d at 137. For a discussion of Diomnsio, see notes 24-27 and accompanying text
supra.
52. 686 F.2d at 137. The Mills court stated that even though it had concluded
that the summons to appear before the grand jury was not a seizure, Dioniio required
the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence from the individual to be subjected to fourth amendment analysis. Id. For a discussion of the two levels of potential fourth amendment violations, see note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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seizures of body evidence which are subject to the constraints of the fourth
amendment and those which are not.5 3 In doing so, the court did not limit
itself to cases dealing with a grand jury directive because it believed that the
basis for determining whether a seizure of physical evidence is subject to
54
The Mills
fourth amendment protection to be the same in all situations.
court contrasted the less intrusive nature of the fingerprinting process in Davis v. Mississippi with the severe intrusion beneath the body surface in Schmerber v. Califom'a.55 The majority observed that the interests in "human
dignity and privacy" and the "intrusion beyond the body's surface" caused
the Supreme Court to subject the blood sampling in Schmerber to fourth
amendment scrutiny, whereas the fingerprinting process in Davis involved
private life and thoughts' that
none of the " 'probing into an individual's
56
mark an interrogation or search."
Turning to the Supreme Court's decision in Dionisio, the Mils court
viewed as determinative the fact that a person's voice is constantly exposed
to the public, thereby precluding application of the fourth amendment be57
Furthermore, the
cause of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
majority noted that the Supreme Court, in Dionisio, had distinguished blood
sampling from voice exemplars on the basis of the greater intrusion involved
in extracting blood from a person's body. 58 Finally, the Mills court examined the Cupp decision and observed the Court's continued inquiry into
whether
the extent and nature of the intrusion as the basis for determining
59
evidence.
body
of
seizure
the
to
applies
amendment
the fourth
53. 686 F.2d at 137-39.
54. Id. at 137.

55. Id. at 137-38. The Mills court stressed the fact that the fingerprinting process is "a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police
searches and detentions" and provides a reliable and effective crime-solving tool
which is not subject to the abuses of lineups or police interrogations. Id. (quoting
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)). For a discussion of Davis, see notes
38-40 and accompanying text supra.
56. 686 F.2d at 138 (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)). For
a discussion of blood sampling and fingerprinting, see notes 32-35 & 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
57. 686 F.2d at 138. The Mills court also noted that a grand jury need not
satisfy the requirement of reasonableness before enforcing the request for the production of voice exemplars because the seizure of a person's voice does not reach the level
of a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security." Md.(quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)). For a discussion of Teny, see notes 29-31
and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, in its discussion of Donisio, the majority
emphasized that "an individual has no expectation of privacy with respect to that
which he knowingly exposes to the public at large, such as voice and appearance."
686 F.2d at 138 (citing United States v. Doe (In re Schwartz), 475 F.2d 895, 898-99
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. dented, 410 U.S. 941 (1973)). See also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For a discussion of Kaiz, see notes 18-22 and accompanying
text supra.
58. 686 F.2d at 138-39.

59. Id. In evaluating the Cupp decision, the majority pointed to the fact that the
constantly exposed
scraping process goes beyond "mere 'physical characteristics ...
to the public' " and therefore, the seizure implicated the fourth amendment. Id.
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The majority compared the contemplated seizure in Mills to these decisions and concluded that the compelled production of hair samples by a
grand jury was analagous to the lesser intrusion involved in the fingerprinting process.60 The Court distinguished hair sampling from blood sampling
and fingernail scraping, where the fourth amendment is implicated, on the
grounds that these latter sampling procedures require production of evidence below the body surface and which is not exposed to the public. 6 The
Mlls majority concluded that head and facial hair is constantly exposed to
the public. 6 2 Furthermore, in terms of intrusiveness, the court decided that
the seizure of head and facial hair was "more like the involuntary touching,
inking, and pressing" involved in fingerprinting.6 3 Accordingly, since fingerprints could be seized by a grand jury without implicating the fourth
64
amendment, so could head and facial hair.
Judge Gibbons filed a concurring opinion agreeing that the district
court's decision should be reversed, but argued that the hair sampling was a
seizure subject to the protections of the fourth amendment. 65 He found a
very real expectation of privacy with respect to the pulling or clipping of
hair and noted that only the appearance of one's hair is offered to public
view. 66 Judge Gibbons also viewed the removal of hair as a serious intru(quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)). For a discussion of Cupp, see
notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
60. 686 F.2d at 139. The majority stated: "Although the issue is admittedly
close, we conclude that there is no greater expectation of privacy with respect to hair
which is on public display than with respect to voice, handwriting or fingerprints."
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id. The court also concluded that hair sampling was not the same "annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience" involved in the police
patdown search in Terry v. Ohio. 686 F.2d at 139 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1968)). For a discussion of Terry, see notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
64. 686 F.2d at 139. Although the majority concluded that the seizure of hair
was not within the ambit of the fourth amendment, it felt that the Supreme Court's
decision in Schmerber required the court to additionally examine the manner of sampling. Id. at 139-40. Because no issue was raised concerning the manner of sampling
or any claim that the grand jury was going to seize the unexposed hair root, the
majority found no fourth amendment violation. Id. at 140. See Imwinkelreid, Forensic
Hair Analysis. The Case Against the Underemployment of Sctentiftc Evidence, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 41, 53-58 (1982) (a snip of hair without the root is often adequate for

identification purposes). The court refused to decide whether the seizure of the root
along with the hair would create a different result. 686 F.2d at 140.
65. 686 F.2d at 139 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 141 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons agreed with the majority that the request to appear before a grand jury did not implicate the fourth
amendment. Id. He then interpreted Dionisio to require a two-step analysis when
examining the actual seizure of evidence from the individual. Id. at 141-42 (Gibbons,
J., concurring). For a discussion of the two levels of potential fourth amendment
violation, see note 12 and accompanying text supra. Initially, Judge Gibbons measured the expectation of privacy a person has in the subject of the seizure. 686 F.2d
at 141-42 (Gibbons, J., concurring). In this regard, Judge Gibbons concluded that
only the appearance of one's hair is offered for public view. Id. Judge Gibbons next
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sion, at least as great as a patdown search or a fingernail scraping procedure.6 7 However, Judge Gibbons believed that even though the grand jury
request was subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment, the seizure
was reasonable because it was executed pursuant to a court order enforcing a
68
valid grand jury subpoena.
In reviewing the Mills decision, it is submitted that the expectation of
examined the intrusiveness of the particular means of the search or seizure, and
viewed the hair sampling "as [at] least as great" an intrusion as a patdown search or
fingernail scraping. Id. Judge Gibbons then concluded that Mills' expectation of
privacy and the intrusiveness of the seizure "merged" into a finding that the fourth
amendment was implicated. Id.
67. 686 F.2d at 142 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons was concerned
that "[t]he context in which a search or seizure is performed should not change what
we call the action, but rather should inform as to the reasonableness of the search or
seizure." Id. at 143 (Gibbons, J., concurring). According to Judge Gibbons, "anytime the government's action involves the uninvited laying on of hands to perform a
search . . . or to obtain a material thing . . . or where the action involves an actual
invasion of the body. . . the action is a search under the fourth amendment." Id. at
142 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
68. 686 F.2d at 143-46 (Gibbons, J., concurring). According to Judge Gibbons,
the fourth amendment inquiry does not end with a finding that the amendment is
implicated, since the fourth amendment only protects against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures. Id. at 144 (Gibbons, J., concurring). In evaluating the reasonableness of the grand jury request for hair samples, Judge Gibbons thought "the
appropriate injury is not limited to whether it is reasonable not to obtain a search
warrant, but should consider whether the search or seizure itself is reasonable under
the circumstances." Id. (citing United States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir.
1969)). Judge Gibbons decided that the grand jury request for hair samples was
reasonable because it was effected pursuant to a court order enforcing the grand jury
subpoena. Id. at 144 (Gibbons, J., concurring). He offered the following reasons to
support his conclusion: 1) the grand jury is a shield against overzealous prosecution;
2) appearance before a grand jury is different from an encounter with the police;
3) grand jury demands are not self-enforcing; and 4) the courts have supervisory
power to investigate the relevancy and proper use of grand jury subpoenas. Id. at
144-45 (Gibbons, J., concurring) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)
(grand jury protects the public from oppressive prosecution); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015
(1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973)
(government must make by affidavit a minimum showing that items sought by grand
jury subpoenas are relevant to the investigation and not sought for other purposes);
United States v. Doe (In re Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
dented, 410 U.S. 941 (1973) (grand jury proceedings are secret as contrasted with the
public nature of encounters with the police)).
In the final analysis, Judge Gibbons concluded that "[w]hile the seizure of head
and facial hair should under other circumstances require a warrant based upon probable cause, in the context of a grand jury investigation Mills' minimal fourth amendment privacy interests must yield to the interests served by the grand jury as an
institution." Id. at 146 (Gibbons, J., concurring). See United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 707-13 (1973) (grand jury has an overriding interest in obtaining evidence);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (it is a longstanding principle that the
grand jury has a right to obtain evidence except where constitutional, common law,
or statutory protections apply); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)
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privacy an individual possesses in head and facial hair should not turn on
such an artificial distinction as its exposure to the public. 69 As Judge Gibbons explained in his concurring opinion, the exposure of hair to the public
should not destroy any privacy interest a person has when the government
seeks to physically remove it from the body. 70 In fact, the public exposure
doctrine has been used by the Supreme Court to negate privacy interests
only where the desired evidence can be discerned without physical removal
71
from the body.
Furthermore, after Katz v. United States, it is clear that the fourth amendment protects people from governmental intrusions where an expectation of
privacy exists. 72 As the focus of the fourth amendment is upon the individual, rather than places, the privacy interest involved in the seizure of a person's hair should be considered reasonable by the standards of contemporary
society.7 3 One clearly has an expectation "that government will not detain
74
us unwillingly to comb through, pull or clip our head and beard hairs."
The reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in head and facial hair is
further supported by judicial decisions finding the length of one's hair to be
protected by the Constitution.7 5 It is inconsistent that the length of hair
should be considered a constitutionally protectable interest yet its seizure
("The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.").
69. For a discussion of the approach adopted by the Mills court, see notes 60-64
and accompanying text supra.
70. See 686 F.2d at 142 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons stated,
We do not offer the hair itself for others to clip or comb through. For example, while one can expect that his fingerprint might be lifted from a door
knob, he does not expect that the offending finger tip will be lopped off. In
a very real sense, then, individuals have an expectation of privacy with respect to their hair, an expectation that others will not comb through it, pull
it, or clip it without their consent.
d.
71. See notes 24-48 and accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra.
73. See United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (evaluation of privacy must take into account "both contemporary norms of social conduct
and the imperatives of a viable democratic society."). See also W. LAFAVE, Supra note
12, § 2.1, at 232; Gross, The Concept of.Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L.REV. 34, 36 (1967) ("Privacy . ..is a creature of life in a human community and not the contrivance of a
legal system concerned with its protection.").
74. See 686 F.2d at 142 n.l (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons concluded
that an individual has an expectation of privacy in hair, "bolstered by the fact that
great expense and effort are often devoted to grooming and maintaining our hair, as
well as by the social, political and even religious symbolic significance often attached
to one's cut of hair or beard." Id.
75. See Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1974) (hair length is a
fundamental right); Torvik v. Deborah Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779, 779 (8th
Cir. 1972) ("Every individual enjoys the liberty to wear the hair style he chooses.").
See generall W. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 278-79 (1980). It should be noted
that the Third Circuit reversed its earlier decisions and has sustained school authority
to regulate hair length. See Zeller v. Donagel School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600
(3d Cir. 1975).
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76

does not implicate the fourth amendment.
It is further submitted that the significant intrusion involved in the sam77
It
pling of head and facial hair was too easily dismissed by the majority.
an
exammust be kept in mind that a proper analysis under Dionist'o requires
ination of both the expectation of privacy a person has in the subject of the
78
In Mills, in addition to the
seizure, and the intrusiveness of the seizure.
fact that a part of an individual's body is being physically removed by the
government, the seizure involves the same type of "uninvited laying on" of
hands which the Supreme Court subjected to the fourth amendment in Terry
v. Ohio. 79 The interests in human dignity and personal security should be no
less important when a grand jury desires physical evidence than when the
80
The forum in
police search for weapons during the detention of a suspect.
which a seizure takes place should not be relevant in determining the application of the fourth amendment; rather, it should only be a factor in deter81
mining the reasonableness of the search or seizure.
Finally, it is suggested that the Third Circuit's standard of the existence
of the evidence above or below the body surface does not provide an ade8 2
In
quate line of demarcation for application of the fourth amendment.
Cupp v. Murphy, the evidence obtained through the fingernail scraping proce83
Nonetheless,
dure did not technically exist below the surface of the body.
8 4
It is suggested that an individual's
the fourth amendment was implicated.
expectation of privacy in his body should always implicate the fourth
amendment where the desired evidence must be physically removed from an
individual's body.8 5 In this manner, a clearer line can be drawn between
76. See notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
79. For a discussion of Terry, see notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
80. In Terry L. Ohio, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the words
"search" and "seizure" should serve as talismans. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
(1968). The Court also rejected the assertion that anything less than a technical arrest does not implicate the fourth amendment. Id. In the principal case, where the
majority has chosen an "all or nothing" approach towards application of the fourth
amendment, it follows that a legal detention by the police would permit them to take
hair samples because no fourth amendment seizure would take place. See 686 F.2d at
139.

81. See 686 F.2d at 143 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons was concerned that the majority's holding "creates the anamoly that nearly identical actions
may or may not be termed "searches and seizures" and given fourth amendment
scrutiny depending only upon who in the government performs them, the police or
agents of the grand jury." Id.
82. For a discussion of the approach adopted by the majority, see notes 60-64

and accompanying text supra.
83. 412 U.S. at 292. The police observed a dark spot on the defendant's finger
and suspected that it might be dried blood. Id. Based upon this visual observation
and the fact that "evidence of strangulation is often found under the assailant's
fingernails," the police conducted the sampling procedure. Id.
84. Id. at 295. For a discussion of Cupp, see notes 36-37 and accompanying text
supra.
85. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.6, at 366.
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seizures such as fingerprinting, voice and handwriting exemplars, which do
not involve the fourth amendment, and seizures such as blood sampling,
fingernail scraping, and other sampling procedures requiring the physical
86
removal of evidence from the body.
Examining the impact of the Mills decision, the refusal to apply the
fourth amendment to the sampling of head and facial hair would appear to
permit the government to circumvent the fourth amendment in the investigatory stages of prosecution. 87 Although the Mills decision concerned the
context of grand jury investigations, the same reasoning would appear to
permit the police to sample head and facial hair where a suspect is legally
detained.8 8 At the very least, the Mills decision might permit the police to
obtain certain body evidence through the use of the grand jury subpoena
power instead of resorting to the warrant procedure and its probable cause
requirement. 89 No probable cause need be demonstrated to compel a person
°0
to appear before the grand jury and to take hair samples.
In conclusion, the Mills court has declared that future seizures of body
evidence should be measured against the extremes of fingerprinting and
blood sampling to determine whether the fourth amendment is implicated.
This approach provides little guidance for future decisions and may cause
the lower courts to engage in the same type of hair splitting undertaken by
the majority.
Colnsj Seie, Jr.

86. Id. Professor LaFave, in his treatise on the fourth amendment, recognized
that "[t]he line between Schmerber and Dtnzio is not always easy to draw." Id. Examining the grand jury request for hair samples, Professor LaFave points out that
"while the hair is 'constantly exposed' in the sense that the person knowingly exposes
the color and style of his hair, it cannot be said that the hair is exposed in the sense of
revealing those characteristics which can be determined only by microscopic examination." Id. Professor LaFave then reviewed the relevance of Cupp V. Murphy to the
seizure of hair samples and stated that
Cupp indicates . . . that even though one walks into a police station with
evidence connecting him with a homocide on his hands in plain view, that
person nonetheless has a protected expectation of privacy with respect to
that evidence when its incriminating character is not evident to the naked
eye and it must be seized and then subjected to microscopic analysis to be of
evidentiary value.

Id.
87. For a discussion of the approach adopted by the majority, see notes 60-64
and accompanying text supra.

88. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,47 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall expressed the concern that "if the grand jury may summon criminal
suspects for [investigative] purposes without complying with the Fourth Amendment,
it will obviously present an attractve investigative tool to prosecutor and police." Id.
See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 12, at § 9.6 at 151.
89. See notes 25 & 64 and accompanying text supra.

90. Id.
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